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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal stems from an unusual order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, directing the "United States of America [to] 
take steps to prevent [Franklin Uzo Igbonwa's] deportation 
to Nigeria." Igbonwa, a Nigerian citizen who initially entered 
the United States in 1986 as a non-immigrant visitor for 
pleasure, was indicted by a federal grand jury and 
convicted in 1990 for drug violations. In a habeas corpus 
proceeding brought by Igbonwa in 1996, the district court 
found that despite a written plea agreement which made no 
reference whatsoever to his deportation, the Assistant 
United States Attorney (AUSA) orally promised, as part of 
the plea bargain, that Igbonwa would not be deported. The 
court directed that the United States take measures to 
prevent Igbonwa's deportation. The Government timely 
appealed. We reverse the order prohibiting deportation, but 
affirm the district court's denial of the defendant's motion 




Franklin Uzo Igbonwa is a Nigerian citizen who entered 
the United States in 1986 as a "non-immigrant visitor for 
pleasure." Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) 
adjusted Igbonwa's status to that of conditional permanent 
resident in 1987 following his marriage to a United States 
citizen. In 1989, Igbonwa petitioned to remove the 
conditional element of his immigration status. INS denied 
his petition on November 29, 1989, when the agency 
determined that his marriage was a sham marriage entered 
into solely for the purpose of securing Igbonwa permanent 
resident status. INS began proceedings to terminate his 
conditional permanent resident status in 1990, but these 
proceedings were administratively halted on March 8, 1990, 
due to Igbonwa's incarceration on narcotics offenses. 
 
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Igbonwa in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on two counts of 
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possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He negotiated a plea agreement with 
the United States Attorney's Office in Philadelphia. The 
agreement stated that Igbonwa would plead guilty to the 
two counts of the indictment and cooperate with the 
Government in future criminal investigations, in exchange 
for which the Government would file a motion 
recommending a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(e) and United States Sentencing Guideline § 5K1.1 if 
it deemed Igbonwa's cooperation satisfactory. The plea 
agreement further provided that "no additional promises, 
agreements or conditions have been entered into other than 
those set forth in this document and that none will be 
entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties." 
The plea agreement made no references relating to 
deportation. 
 
In accordance with the plea agreement, Igbonwa pled 
guilty on November 20, 1990. During his plea colloquy, 
Igbonwa averred that no additional representations or 
promises had been made and that he had not been induced 
to enter into the plea agreement by any promises beyond 
those in the written agreement. The court sentenced 
Igbonwa to nine years in prison on each count, the two 
sentences to run concurrently, and ten years of supervised 
release.1 In 1994, the Governmentfiled a Rule 35(b) motion 
recommending a reduction in Igbonwa's prison sentence for 
his cooperation and testimony in a criminal investigation 
conducted in the District of Maryland. The district court 
granted the motion and reduced Igbonwa's imprisonment 
by three years. 
 
On August 5, 1993, INS began an investigation to 
determine whether Igbonwa was subject to deportation and 
served a detainer notice on the warden of the prison where 
Igbonwa was incarcerated. In August of 1995, INS initiated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the time of his arrest, Igbonwa had previously been convicted in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania of conspiracy to commit offenses against 
the United States, false statements, and false use of a social security 
number. This previous conviction was relied upon in determining 
Igbonwa's criminal history for purposes of sentencing under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines but is not a deportable offense under 8 
U.S.C. § 1251. 
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deportation hearings against Igbonwa, and an immigration 
judge issued an order of deportation on October 5, 1995. 
Igbonwa finished serving his criminal sentence in 
December, 1995, and has remained in prison pending his 
deportation pursuant to the INS detainer notice. 
 
In February, 1996, Igbonwa filed a motion in the district 
court for return of seized property, and at this time raised 
the issue of a promise allegedly made by AUSA Ronald 
Jarvis during the course of the plea agreement negotiations. 
Igbonwa asserted that the AUSA promised him the 
Government would not deport him if he cooperated in other 
heroin trafficking investigations. Igbonwa further asserted 
that he relied on AUSA Jarvis' promise when he agreed to 
enter into the plea agreement. Igbonwa further stated that 
an INS agent, Jim Martinelli, attended one of these plea 
negotiations between Jarvis and Igbonwa and, according to 
Igbonwa, basically stated that if the Government agreed not 
to deport Igbonwa, then INS would concur in that decision. 
 
After conducting hearings on the issue, the district court 
found that the promise had been made, that the promise 
was enforceable, and that it must be enforced. Thus, the 
district court granted Igbonwa's motion for specific 
performance of the plea agreement entered into between the 
two parties and directed that the "United States of America 
shall take steps to prevent the defendant's deportation to 
Nigeria." The United States appealed from that order. 
Igbonwa filed a cross-appeal from the January 15, 1997 
order of the district court denying his motion to be released 







As a threshold matter, the Government contends that 
this court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal and that 
the district court had no power to hear Igbonwa's motion in 
light of recent legislation designed to restrict the habeas 
corpus rights of an alien subject to an order of deportation. 
Congress, in accordance with its broad powers in matters of 
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immigration, limited the right of judicial review of 
deportation orders by passing the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), P.L. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The IIRIRA, which became 
effective on April 1, 1997, states: 
 
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 
of any alien arising from a decision or action by the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 
under this Act. 
 
IIRIRA, § 306(a) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(g)). This 
provision applies "without limitation to claims arising from 
all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings under such Act." IIRIRA,§ 306(c)(1). 
Courts reviewing this statute have determined that"the 
IIRIRA removed the jurisdiction of the [federal courts] to 
hear habeas claims under all other federal statutes." See 
Charan v. Schiltgen, No. C 96-3061 FMS, 1997 WL 135938, 
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1997). Thus, the Government 
argues strenuously that this law abrogates the order of the 
district court and divests all federal courts, including this 
court, of current and future jurisdiction over Igbonwa's 
§ 2255 motion. 
 
In the alternative, the Government argues that the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Igbonwa's petition for habeas corpus relief because Igbonwa 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the 
filing of this petition, as required by 8 U.S.C.§ 1105(a). The 
district court found that Igbonwa was not required to 
exhaust these remedies under Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 
416 (3d Cir. 1996), which permits judicial consideration of 
claims "that are not of the type intended to be reviewed 
under [the administrative scheme], especially if such claims 
could not otherwise receive meaningful review." Massieu, 91 
F.3d at 422 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 
U.S. 200, 212 (1994)). These are claims which are"wholly 
collateral" to the administrative review process. Id. The 
Government argues that Igbonwa's challenge to the 
deportation order goes to the heart of the order-- the 
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authority of INS to issue this order -- and therefore this 
claim is not "wholly collateral" to administrative review. 
Thus, the Government asserts that the district court also 
lacked jurisdiction over Igbonwa's § 2255 motion because of 
his failure to exhaust all adminstrative remedies. 
 
With due regard to the Government's argument, we need 
not resolve issues unnecessary to the disposition of this 
case. "[A] court need not reach difficult questions of 
jurisdiction when the case can be resolved on some other 
ground in favor of the same party." Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996), aff 'd, 65 
U.S.L.W. 4635 (June 25, 1997). In the present matter, we 
resolve the merits of the appeal in favor of the Government, 
who had raised the matter of jurisdiction. Therefore, we 
decline to address the jurisdictional issues raised by the 
Government in this case2 and proceed to an analysis of the 




A district court's factual findings are subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Under this standard, a finding is "clearly erroneous when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This case presents an unusual circumstance because we reverse the 
district court's order pertaining to deportation. Usually when we decide 
the merits of an appeal without reaching a jurisdictional issue, we affirm 
the district court's order. See, e.g. , United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 
474-75 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, it could be said that in assuming 
jurisdiction we are not acting in favor of the party to whose benefit the 
objection to jurisdicition would redound. Id.  at 474. After all, if we 
dismissed the appeal we would benefit Igbonwa if the dismissal meant 
that the district court's order would stand. 
 
The foregoing analysis, however, is inapplicable here because the 
Government certainly does not contend that we should dismiss the 
appeal but allow the district court's order to remain. Rather, it contends 
that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over this case, an argument 
which, if accepted, would result in the district court order being vacated. 
Clearly, it is not in Igbonwa's interest that we take that position. Thus, 
we cannot view the jurisdictional issue as being limited to appellate 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, viewing the challenge to jurisdiction to relate to 
both the district court and this court, we are acting in Igbonwa's interest 
by taking jurisdiction or, at worst, not prejudicing him. 
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`the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.' " United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 85 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)), cert. denied sub nom. 
O'Rourke v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1812 (1995). This 
standard does not permit the reviewing court to conduct a 
de novo review of the evidence, but it does allow the court 
to consider whether there is enough evidence in the record 
to support the factual findings of the district court. Cooper 
v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988). This review is 
more deferential with respect to determinations about the 
credibility of witnesses, and when the district court's 
decision is based on testimony that is coherent and 
plausible, not internally inconsistent and not contradicted 
by external evidence, there can almost never be afinding of 
clear error. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 
U.S. 564, 575, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985). 
 
On this record, there is only one source of evidence that 
the alleged promise existed: Igbonwa. Only Igbonwa's 
testimony supports the existence of the alleged agreement; 
the district court relied on no other evidence. The court 
found that this promise had been made after determining 
that Igbonwa was an "intelligent, articulate man" who gave 
credible testimony. However, the same court had previously 
sentenced Igbonwa to a year above the recommended 
sentence after concluding that Igbonwa had not been 
candid with the court. In fact, at one earlier hearing, the 
court referred to Igbonwa as a "prevaricating, polygraph- 
flunking putative perjurer." 
 
Additionally, Igbonwa's own testimony in this proceeding 
is marred by inconsistencies with prior assertions he made 
pertaining to this agreement and other matters related to 
his deportation. Igbonwa now asserts that the alleged 
promise was made during meetings he had alone with 
AUSA Jarvis, without the presence of counsel. However, 
Igbonwa sued his former counsel for legal malpractice in 
1995, charging that his attorney conducted the plea 
negotiations without Igbonwa's knowledge or presence and 
that Igbonwa was not a party to the negotiations in any 
meaningful way. Additionally, at every point up until the 
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deportation order was executed, Igbonwa continued to 
acknowledge that the only terms of the plea agreement were 
those contained within the written document and that there 
were no additional terms. 
 
The district court concluded that "Mr. Igbonwa's 
testimony is not a recent fabrication in the face of a 
deportation order." United States v. Igbonwa , No. 90-375, 
slip. op. at 9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1996). The court noted that 
Igbonwa had "presented the same testimony at a Rule 35 
hearing in January, 1994, and again at a hearing on his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in February, 1995, long 
before the INS began deportation proceedings." Id. Thus, 
the court found as facts that Igbonwa had expressed 
concerns regarding his deportation to Jarvis, that Jarvis 
responded to these concerns with a promise that the 
"United States would take steps to prevent Mr. Igbonwa's 
deportation, and that Igbonwa reasonably relied on this 
promise before agreeing to plead guilty." Id . 
 
The record, however, does not support many of the 
indicia of reliability and credibility that the district court 
accepted in evaluating Igbonwa's testimony. First, the 
investigation into the deportation proceeding actually began 
in 1993, as evidenced by the detainer notice sent to the 
warden of FCI-Oakdale on August 5, 1993. Thus, although 
it is correct, as the district court found, that Igbonwa's 
claim arose before the official "deportation proceedings" had 
begun, the investigation had been progressing for some 
time when Igbonwa first raised this alleged promise. 
Additionally, a similar investigation had been initiated as 
early as 1989, but was halted when the criminal 
proceedings against Igbonwa commenced. Thus, it is likely 
that Igbonwa was aware of the investigation into his 
deportability long before the official deportation proceedings 
began in late 1995. 
 
Additionally, it is unclear when Igbonwafirst raised this 
alleged promise. The district court found that Igbonwa first 
raised this promise at a January 1994 hearing. The record 
reflects that Igbonwa did not state at this hearing that any 
promise not to deport him was made. Specifically, Igbonwa 
said that he turned down the Government's offer to place 
him in the Witness Protection Program, because the threat 
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to his safety was in Nigeria, not in the United States. But 
he did not assert that the United States Attorney's Office 
had promised him that he would not be deported by any 
branch of the United States Government. 
 
At the February 1995 hearing on Igbonwa's § 2255 
motion, Igbonwa first stated that he had not been permitted 
to participate in any of the negotiations related to the plea 
agreement. Later, Igbonwa asserted that the non- 
deportation promise was made to him in the larger context 
of discussions regarding the Witness Protection Program. 
However, Igbonwa also acknowledged that Jarvis told him 
that United States Attorney's Office would not be able to 
prevent his deportation, stating: "I said for the record that 
[Jarvis] told me Franklin, we cannot be able to save you 
against deportation. . . . He said Franklin, we the United 
States Attorney's Office cannot be able to save you from 
being deported by the INS." Igbonwa's claim that an INS 
agent, Jim Martinelli, echoed Jarvis' promise was not raised 
in his initial § 2255 motion and Igbonwa only raised it after 
Jarvis testified that Martinelli was one of the INS agents 
who communicated with Igbonwa during the proffer 
sessions.3 Thus, the evidence relied upon by the district 
court is simply insufficient to support the finding that 
AUSA Jarvis had promised Igbonwa that the Government 
would not deport him. 
 
Moreover, all other evidence in the case establishes that 
this alleged promise of non-deportation was never made. 
The written plea agreement does not include the alleged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Even the language that Igbonwa attributes to Jarvis regarding the 
non-deportation promise -- "we can work with that" -- is language he 
previously attributed to Jarvis on a sentencing issue. In a letter to his 
former attorney, Daniel Alva, Igbonwa wrote: 
 
"Then I asked openly what I stand to gain if I go to the Grand Jury. 
Then Mr. Jarvis asked me what I would want and you (Alva) gave 
me go ahead to say what I want. I then said that I would want "time 
served", and Mr. Jarvis said "at worst?", and I said "or a three yr. 
sentence". Mr. Jarvis indeed nodded in agreement and further 
stated "we can work with that". 
 
Nowhere in the letter does Igbonwa refer to any alleged promises made 
pertaining to deportation. 
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promise; on the contrary, it contains a specific provision 
establishing that all promises made in connection with the 
agreement are within the four corners of the document and 
that no additional promises would be entered into"unless 
in writing and signed by all parties." Both Jarvis and 
Igbonwa's attorney testified that the alleged promise was 
never made during any of the proffer sessions. The district 
court's finding that Igbonwa feared deportation and that he 
mentioned those fears to Jarvis does not establish that the 
promise was made.4 Thus, the great weight of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that no such promise was made, 
and the district court's factual finding that the promise was 





The Government further argues that the district court 
erred when it found that the AUSA who allegedly made this 
promise regarding deportation to Igbonwa had the authority 
to bind other branches of the United States Government, 
specifically INS. This issue raises a question of law and 
accordingly our review is plenary. Graham v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 998 F.2d 194, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The authority of a federal prosecuting attorney 
peremptorily to bind another department of the 
Government presents an issue of first impression in our 
court. The courts which have addressed this issue have 
split on the question of whether a United States Attorney or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The dissent expresses the fear that the majority "condemns [appellant] 
to a substantial risk of death resulting directly from his cooperation with 
the United States government." Dissent op. at 19 n.6. This is a highly 
speculative conclusion, attributable solely to Igbonwa's self-serving 
testimony to escape deportation. Moreover, the United States does not 
and cannot serve as a safe-haven for every deportable alien who alleges 
that he may be killed if he is returned to his native country as a result 
of his criminal activity. If Igbonwa truly fears for his safety upon his 
return to Nigeria, we suggest that Igbonwa request that the Attorney 
General deport him to another country that would afford him greater 
protection from these alleged threats. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1253 
(Supp. 1997) (governing country to which alien will be deported). 
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his or her assistant can make a promise regarding 
deportation matters which will be binding on the entire 
United States Government. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
have both ruled that a federal prosecuting attorney who 
makes a promise of non-deportation during the course of a 
plea agreement has authority to bind INS and that this 
promise is enforceable against INS. See Margalli-Olvera v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 43 F.3d 345, 354 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 
35 F.3d 1332, 1343 (9th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit, 
however, has ruled that an AUSA does not have the 
authority to make a non-deportation promise as part of 
plea agreement. See San Pedro v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 79 F.3d 1065, 1072 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 431 (1996).5 
 
In Thomas, the alien entered into a plea agreement with 
a United States Attorney which specifically stated that "the 
United States of America (hereafter "Government," which 
term includes its departments, officers, agents and 
agencies) . . . will not oppose any motions made by your 
counsel for reduction of sentence, modification or relief 
from deportation to the Court, parole commission and U.S. 
Immigration Service." 35 F.3d at 1335 n.1. The alien sought 
specific performance of this plea agreement, and INS 
argued that it was not bound by this promise made by a 
United States Attorney. 35 F.3d at 1135. The Ninth Circuit 
first noted that actual authority, either express or implied, 
is necessary to bind the United States Government; 
estoppel and apparent authority generally will not suffice. 
Id. at 1336. The court acknowledged that the United States 
Attorney had statutory authority to "prosecute for all 
offenses against the United States." Id. at 1338-39. From 
this express grant of authority, the court held that, under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is perhaps worth noting that all three of these cases are 
distinguishable from the case sub judice in that written promises were 
included in the plea agreement. See San Pedro , 79 F.3d at 1067 n.1 
("United States agrees . . . not to prosecute[alien] for any other 
offenses"); Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 348 ("United States will 
recommend against deportation"); Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1335-36 n.1 
("Government will not oppose any motions made . .. [for] relief from 
deportation"). 
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principles of agency law, this granted the United States 
Attorney the "implied authority" to enter plea agreements, 
and that this implied authority bound the Government as 
a whole. Id. at 1340. Additionally, the court considered its 
conclusion bolstered by the Attorney General's supervisory 
power over both agencies. Id. at 1340-41. 
 
In Margalli-Olvera, the alien entered a plea agreement 
which stated, in pertinent part, that "if the defendant 
participates fully and truthfully in a debriefing,. . . the 
United States will recommend against deportation. 
Otherwise, the United States will remain silent regarding 
deportation." 43 F.3d at 348. The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's refusal to 
enforce this promise and upheld the order of deportation. 
Id. at 349. Upon petition for review, the Eighth Circuit held 
"that, if unambiguous, the term `United States' is a 
reference to the entire United States government and all the 
agencies thereof." Id. at 352. The court then followed the 
reasoning of Thomas and agreed that "the express grant of 
`authority to "prosecute" implies the power to make plea 
agreements incidental to the prosecution.' " Id. at 353 
(quoting Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1339). Accordingly, the court 
held that "an Assistant United States Attorney has actual 
authority to bind the INS." Id. at 354. 
 
Most recently, in San Pedro, an alien sought specific 
performance of a promise in the plea agreement not to 
prosecute the alien for any other offenses, which he 
asserted included a promise not to deport him. 79 F.3d at 
1067. The district court found that this promise did not 
bind INS and thus was not enforceable. Id. at 1068. On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Thomas  and 
Margalli-Olvera that only actual authority would bind the 
Government. Id. at 1068. However, the Ninth Circuit found 
that the United States Attorney's Office did not have actual 
authority to bind the INS. Id. at 1071. The Eleventh Circuit 
considered the specific delegations of power to the United 
States Attorney's Office and to INS, and concluded that the 
United States Attorney's Office would only have the power 
to bind INS if the Attorney General specifically delegated 
that power. Id. at 1070. The court found no such delegation 
of this power, and held that a United States Attorney did 
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not have the authority to bind INS by a promise of non- 
deportation made in a plea agreement. Id. at 1072. 
 
After careful consideration, this court finds the reasoning 
of San Pedro, which considered the specific nature of the 
statutes delegating immigration matters to INS and criminal 
matters to the United States Attorney's Office, more 
persuasive than that of Thomas and Margalli-Olvera, which 
considered the general power the Attorney General has over 
both these agencies. To hold otherwise would grant United 
States Attorneys the power to bind any and every 
governmental agency under the supervision of the Attorney 
General through promises made in the plea agreement. We 
hold that this result does not adhere under either statutory 
law or through application of the ordinary principles of 
agency law, and that a promise made by the United States 
Attorney's Office relating to deportation does not bind the 
INS without explicit authority from the INS. 
 
Bolstering our conclusion, the Eighth Circuit recently 
returned to this issue in United States v. Camacho-Bordes, 
94 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1996). In that case, the plea 
agreement stated that the Government would recommend 
against deportation to the INS. The Eighth Circuit 
concluded that, unlike Margalli-Olvera, which referred to 
the "United States" in the plea agreement and did not 
distinguish between the different agencies involved, the 
distinction between the Government (meaning the United 
States Attorney's Office) and the INS was clearly drawn. 
Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d at 1175. Thus, any agreement on 
the part of the Government obviously did not bind INS. Id. 
This is analogous to the present matter, in which even 
Igbonwa acknowledged that he knew AUSA Jarvis was 
speaking only for the United States Attorney's Office and 
not for INS. At the hearing on the § 2255 motion, Igbonwa 
testified: "[Jarvis] said Franklin, we the United States 
Attorney's Office cannot be able to save you from being 
deported by the INS." United States v. Igbonwa, No. 90-375, 
Feb. 8, 1995 Hearing Transcript at 91. Accordingly, we hold 
that the United States Attorney's Office lacks the authority 
to make a promise pertaining to deportation in the 
prosecution of a criminal matter that will bind INS without 
its express authorization. With formal authorization from 
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the INS, the United States Attorney might be able to 
promise non-deportation. These circumstances do not exist 
here because of the informal verbal nature of the alleged 
promise and Igbonwa's admission that AUSA Jarvis was 




The decision of a district court to refuse a motion for 
release on a defendant's own recognizance is reviewed 
under an extremely deferential standard. The district 
court's decision is presumed correct, and that presumption 
can only be overcome by special circumstances. Hilton v. 
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 774, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 95 L. Ed. 
2d 724 (1987) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 23(d)). No such special 
circumstances are present in this case, and the district 
court's order denying Igbonwa's motion for release on his 
own recognizance pending final resolution of this matter 




For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
granting Igbonwa's motion and ordering the United States 
to specifically perform an alleged promise not to deport 
Igbonwa will be reversed. The order denying Igbonwa's 
motion for release pending resolution of these proceedings 
will be affirmed. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I dissent for two reasons. First, I cannot agree with the 
majority that the district court committed clear error when 
it credited Igbonwa's testimony that he was promised that 
the United States would "take steps to prevent" his 
deportation to Nigeria. See App. 650a. Second, without 
clarification from the district court regarding the precise 
nature of its finding, I am unwilling to conclude that the 
Assistant United States Attorney in question lacked the 
authority to make the promise that the district court found 
was made. Specifically, if, as the government itself suggests 
(see Govt. Br. at 36 n.18), the Assistant United States 
Attorney merely promised that his office would make its 
best effort to prevent Igbonwa's deportation, it is by no 
means clear to me that the Assistant United States 
Attorney exceeded his authority in making the promise that 
he did. 
 
1. Before addressing these questions, however, I will 
briefly discuss what the government characterizes as a 
threshold jurisdictional argument, i.e., that section 306(g) 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
Div. C. Title III, § 306(g), 110 Stat. 3009, codified as 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(g), retroactively divested the district court of 
jurisdiction and therefore requires reversal here. Section 
306(g) provides: 
 
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 
under this chapter. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)(emphasis added). Section 306(c) of the 
IIRIRA states that section 306(g) "shall apply without 
limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future 
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under the 
Act" (emphasis added). 
 
These provisions might assist the government were it not 
for the fact that the district court's final order was signed 
 
                                16 
on August 26, 1996, more than a month before the IIRIRA 
was enacted on September 30, 1996.1 Both of the statutory 
provisions quoted above used the future tense ("shall have" 
and "shall apply"). Thus, they at most affect the jurisdiction 
of the courts beginning the moment after the IIRIRA 
became law. Consequently, the statutory language does not 
support -- on the contrary, it undermines -- the 
government's contention that the IIRIRA retroactively 
divested the district court of jurisdiction over a proceeding 
that was already completed at the district court level. 
 
The government contends that the IIRIRA prospectively 
divested us of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Reply Br. 
at 8 ("this Court has no jurisdiction over this case"). 
However, merely showing that this court was prospectively 
divested of jurisdiction (as opposed to showing that the 
district court was retroactively divested of jurisdiction) 
would not help the government, since the government is the 
party that has appealed from and seeks reversal of the 
district court's order directing the United States to "take 
steps" to prevent Igbonwa's deportation to Nigeria. (In any 
event, the language of section 306(g) affects only appeals 
brought "by or on behalf of [an] alien."). 
 
Even if section 306(g) did not evidence a clear 
congressional intent not to divest the courts retroactively of 
jurisdiction over actions in which they had already entered 
final orders, the presumption of non-retroactivity leads to 
the same conclusion. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
511 U.S. 244, 293 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgments) ("applying a jurisdiction-eliminating statute to 
undo past judicial action would be applying it retroactively").2 
 
2. I cannot agree with the majority that the district 
court committed clear error in finding that the prosecutor 
promised Igbonwa that "the United States would take steps 
to prevent his deportation." App. 650a. Igbonwa gave 
testimony to this effect, and the district court expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government also filed its notice of appeal (on September 24, 1996) 
prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. 
 
2. The government itself quotes and relies on this very passage. See 
Govt. Br. at 22 n.12. 
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found his testimony to be "credible."3 Id. In making this 
finding, the district court judge relied on the knowledge he 
had gained by virtue of his "six-year oversight of these 
proceedings" (id.), which included numerous opportunities 
to speak with and observe Igbonwa personally. There is no 
doubt that the printed record contains evidence that 
supports a contrary finding, and if I had been the district 
court judge, I am not at all sure that I would have believed 
Igbonwa's testimony. But I cannot say that the district 
court's finding, which rests heavily on a credibility 
determination, was clearly erroneous. 
 
3. While I accept the district court's finding, I view it as 
ambiguous in a way that may have important legal 
implications. As noted, the district court found that "the 
United States [promised that it] would take steps to prevent 
[Igbonwa's] deportation." App. 650a (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the district court ordered the United States to 
"take steps to prevent the defendant's deportation." App. 
661a (emphasis added). 
 
One possible interpretation of the district court'sfinding 
is that the United States promised to take whatever 
administrative steps were necessary to prevent Igbonwa's 
deportation. If this is the correct interpretation, then we 
might be required to confront4 the government's arguments 
(a) that under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), the district court was 
precluded from entertaining Igbonwa's motion because he 
had not exhausted his administrative remedies and (b) that 
the Assistant United States Attorney who allegedly made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In a nutshell, Igbonwa's story is that he feared that his cooperation 
with the United States, in its prosecution of the members of a Nigerian 
drug ring, would put him in danger of "violent reprisal" should he ever 
have to return to Nigeria. Id. at 648-650. Given these fears, Igbonwa 
claims that he requested the United States government to grant him -- 
in exchange for his cooperation -- a promise that they would protect him 
from deportation to Nigeria. 
 
4. Igbonwa argues that we should not consider the government's legal 
arguments because they were not presented to the district court. I 
express no view at this time regarding this question. 
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the promise to Igbonwa lacked the authority to make a 
binding commitment regarding deportation.5  
 
Another possible interpretation of the district court's 
finding is that the Assistant United States Attorney simply 
promised that his office would make its best effort to 
persuade those having the decisionmaking authority that 
Igbonwa should not be deported to Nigeria. Under this 
interpretation, the Assistant United States Attorney's 
promise would be similar to a promise to recommend a 
sentence to a sentencing judge who is then free to impose 
whatever lawful sentence the judge finds appropriate. 
Under this interpretation, I am not at all sure that either of 
the legal arguments noted above would be implicated, and 
in any event, the issues might be significantly altered. 
Accordingly, before confronting those difficult issues, I 
would remand for the district court to clarify itsfinding. 
 
For these reasons, I cannot join the decision of the 
majority, and must respectfully dissent.6  
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5. Igbonwa contends that, even if the Assistant United States Attorney 
lacked authority to make such a promise, an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service agent who attended one of the critical meetings 
with Igbonwa possessed such authority. 
 
6. The stakes here are high. If the district court was correct in finding 
Igbonwa credible, then the majority's reversal condemns him to a 
substantial risk of death resulting directly from his cooperation with the 
government. I reiterate, therefore, that I would not reverse the district 
court, but, instead, vacate its order and remand the case for 
clarification. 
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